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Forward or Back: The Future of European Integration and the Impossibility of the Status Quo 
Abstract 
This article considers how the legal and political order of the European Union can cope if the 
‘Ever Closer Union’ envisaged by the Treaties ceases to be inevitable. In particular, it focuses on 
what are the likely consequences if previously successful integration mechanisms such as 
integration through law (including adventurous pro-integration interpretation by the CJEU) and 
functional integration, can no longer successfully push forward the integration process. It 
considers whether it is possible for the Union to ‘stand still’, that is, to maintain the current 
level of integration without either moving forward to more intensive integration or engaging in 
costly and disruptive disintegration. In order to substantiate this claim, the article looks at three 
areas, the law of citizenship, the Eurozone and the legislative structures of the Union, showing 
in each case that the neither the current degree of integration nor methods used in recent 
times to move the integration process forward, provide a long term basis for policy. 
Introduction 
The topical example of the UK aside, there appears to be little political will in EU states to leave 
the Union or to reverse the process of European integration. At the same time, there is also a 
lack of political will for intensive further integration. Could keeping things as they are be a 
possible solution for the European Union? This article suggests that it could not. There is very 
limited political appetite for significant further transfers of political and economic powers to the 
EU. At the same time there is equally, limited support for reversing European integration, for 
example, by leaving the Euro or abolishing free movement rights. This desire to maintain the 
status quo would not be a problem if maintaining currently levels of integration were feasible. 
However, this article argues that this is not the case. The European Union operates on the basis 
that its current legal and institutional arrangements are temporary and will be replaced by 
more integrated versions in the future. Because the current set-up is not designed to be 
permanent, current structures and levels of integration will tend produce policy incoherence1 
                                                           
1 For the purposes of this article I define “policy incoherence” as a situation where different EU rules or a 
combination of EU and national rules, operate at cross purposes, undermining the ability of each to achieve the 
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and unsustainable inflexibility if maintained largely as they are. The Union may therefore 
struggle to cope if, as some Member States desire, it is decided to maintain current levels of 
integration indefinitely rather than moving progressively towards ever closer union. 
The term “integration” has a range of meanings and the Union over the course of its history has 
adopted various methods of integration from outright legal harmonisation and extinguishing of 
the individual competence of Member States in an area, to informal cooperation and 
coordination mechanisms. For the purposes of this article, I use the term “integration” or 
“more integration” as referring to a process through which more authority is granted to EU 
institutions either in the form of the transfer of competence over new areas of policy or by 
adaptation of decision-making rules so that the means by which decisions in relation to such 
policy areas are made becomes more supranational with increased capability for Union bodies 
to make or adapt law and policy without the agreement of all Member States. Central cases of 
this kind of integration would be instances of the extension of Union competence to new areas 
(for example by establishing and conferring powers over monetary policy on the European 
Central Bank), the adaptation of voting rules so that the Union could pass laws on a matter with 
a qualified majority in the Council rather than by unanimity (as occurred in a wide range of 
areas in the Lisbon Treaty) or the extension of the rights conferred on individuals or bodies by 
EU law (as occurred with the passage of legislation expanding the right of EU citizens in the 
Citizenship Directive2 or through Court rulings such as Cassis de Dijon3 which expanded the right 
of businesses to benefit from mutual recognition of regulatory decisions by Member States). It 
could also cover conferral of a co-ordinating or reviewing role for EU institutions where none 
had previously existed though this form is categorised as ‘less intense’ than other forms. 
In order to substantiate its claim, the article looks at three areas, the law of citizenship, the 
Eurozone and the legislative structures of the Union, showing in each case that the current 
degree of integration cannot provide a long-term basis for policy. The first section sets out a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
goals intended or where the rules and structures brought about by the degree of integration achieved to date 
produce otherwise avoidable negative outcomes for the Union and its Member States. 
2 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the rights of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States OJ L 
22929.6.2004 p.35-48. 
3 ReweZentral AG. (120/78) [1979] E.C.R. 649. 
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brief history of integration and the role of the law and EU judiciary in promoting it. It provides 
some reasons why previously successful integration methods may not be as successful as 
before in the future. Section two looks at the recent rulings of the Court of Justice on 
citizenship rights and social welfare entitlements in cases such as Dano4 and Aliamovic5 to 
demonstrate the problems that result when the court feels unable to continue to develop a 
concept such as Union citizenship in a way that continues the expansion of the rights held by EU 
citizens. This section shows how key legal concepts such as EU citizenship and the rights that 
attach to them have been designed on the basis that they would progressively develop in a 
more integrationist direction (i.e. they would come to encompass more and more rights over 
time). This means that attempting to maintain existing EU citizenship rights as they are (rather 
than continually developing them in an integrationist direction), produces severe confusion and 
incoherence in policy. Section three shows how the problems highlighted in Dano are not 
restricted to citizenship issues but are reflective of wider problems faced by the Union, most 
notably in relation to the design of the Eurozone and the structure of the Union’s law-making 
structures themselves which is dealt with in section four. 
Section I: Key Issues and the Impossibility of Partial Integration  
-The Two Costs of Standing Still: Incoherence and Rigidity 
Ever closer union has been a key rhetorical plank of European treaties from the very beginning 
of the integration process and integration in the decades since has usually involved increasing 
the range of competences of the EU and extending the ability of EU institutions to enact 
policies within these areas of competence independently of Member States (for example, by 
allowing the adoption of laws by a qualified majority vote (‘QMV’) ’in the Council of Ministers 
instead of requiring unanimity). In recent years, particularly since the outbreak of the financial 
crisis, other methods of integration that give less power to supranational Union institutions and 
which stress intergovernmental action and mutual monitoring amongst Member States, have 
been attempted. A key contention of this article is that this form of integration is unlikely to 
allow for the effective functioning of the European Union. In some key instances, only the kinds 
                                                           
4 Dano (C-333/13) EU:C:2014:2358, 11 November, 2014. 
5 Alimanovic (C-76/14) EU:C:2015:597, 15 September 2015. 
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of integration that are politically unpalatable such as expansion in the rights granted by EU 
citizenship or increasing the supranational powers of EU institutions in areas such as economic 
policy can address the policy problems faced by the Union and its Member States.6 Neither the 
newer forms of integration attempted nor ‘standing still’ i.e. simply maintaining current levels 
of integration, are not sustainable options because current EU legal principles and decision-
making structures are based on the assumption that they are merely transitional arrangements 
that apply pending the realisation of a more supranational and less intergovernmental future. 
This is problematic as several Member States and much of the European electorate, even if 
broadly content with current levels of integration, are not keen on the idea of an ever 
intensifying increase in integration and in the powers of the Union. ‘Standing still’ and 
maintaining existing EU legal rights and levels of integration without moving progressively to 
more intense integration is not a viable solution. The current distribution of competences 
between Union and Member States, produces incoherence in policy and excessive rigidity in 
many areas. By ‘incoherence’ I mean that this distribution of competences brings about a 
situation where different EU rules operate at cross purposes, undermining the ability of each to 
achieve the goals intended or where the rules and structures brought about by the degree of 
integration achieved to date produce otherwise avoidable negative outcomes for the Union and 
its Member States.  
A degree of incoherence or ineffectiveness is fairly common in a number of polities. What 
makes the kind of incoherence and ineffectiveness experienced by the Union more grave is 
that, current arrangements preclude the Union from resolving such incoherence in effective 
ways. Edmund Burke noted that ‘A State without the means of some change is without the 
means of its conservation’.7 At current levels of integration, decision-making structures in the 
Union are exceptionally rigid and do not provide the necessary means of change in law and 
policy. In order to protect Member State autonomy, they provide so many opportunities to 
prevent change in EU law that they risk preventing the EU legislature from adapting the law in 
the very large range of areas that the Union already regulates. New forms of integration, 
                                                           
6 I will refer to this integration in this way as ‘intensifying integration’ for simplicity’s sake. 
7 E Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford World Classics, 1993) (L G Mitchell ed.). 
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notably in relation to the Eurozone have not succeeded in providing the necessary flexibility 
and may not be applicable to other areas of EU activity. This means that areas such as EU 
employment law and EU environmental policy, where changing information and changing 
economic circumstances mean such adaptation can be vital continue to be subject to 
excessively rigid decision-making structures. In summary, current levels of integration can 
function so as to produce the need for further unattainable integration and that unmet need 
can be damaging. The elements of the status quo are actively damaging may not be changeable 
under current structures. Indeed, even simple adjustment of EU laws that aim only to adapt 
such laws to changing circumstances and which involve no additional integration may be 
unattainable under current structures. This must raise significant doubts as to whether current 
institutional structures can be maintained even if Member States desired to do so.  
-The Transitional Nature of Current Structures and the Interpretation of EU Law: Interpreting 
for the Future 
The idea that current institutional and legal arrangements in the EU are merely transitional 
stages en route to a more integrated future is seen in what is one of the most distinctive 
features of EU constitutional jurisprudence; its relationship to time. The European Court’s 
jurisprudence has always had a peculiar relationship to time. When constitutional courts in 
states are required to make rulings on fundamental questions about the structure of the 
political system or other constitutional norms, they usually approach the relevant legal texts on 
the basis that those texts reflect (or constitute) what kind of a polity the relevant polity already 
is, rather than what it aims to become. A constitution will usually be seen as declaring that a 
state is a parliamentary democracy not that it is destined to become one.8  
Often this ‘is’ draws on the past in that courts look back to the meaning of as they look to what 
kind of system was established by a particular constitutional provision. Even in interpreting 
broad constitutional norms such as the meaning of ‘liberty’ courts often look to the past. 
Originalists in US constitutional interpretation are concerned to identify what the US 
                                                           
8 See for example the decision of the Irish Court of Appeal the striking down legislation giving wide discretion to 
the executive to prohibit various drugs on the grounds that it usurped the legislative power of the parliament 
(Bederev v Ireland [2015] IECA 38). 
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constitution was and what the norms of the US were at the time of the enactment of the 
relevant constitution. Even those who are not originalists and see constitutional norms as living 
or evolving, give weight to legal and political traditions in interpreting the Constitution. For 
example, in deciding what is encompassed by the ‘substantive due process’ clause of the 14th 
Amendment, the US Supreme Court devotes significant attention to the question of whether 
the liberty in question can be seen as deeply rooted in the traditions of the US. Constitution.9 
The invocation of a ‘block of constitutionality’ by the French Constitutional Council also draws 
on principles and traditions from the Republic’s past (such as the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man) to develop a vision of France’s constitutional present.10 
Even where there is no codified constitutional document as in the UK, rulings on key questions 
such the admissibility of evidence tainted by torture, cited the tradition of the common law as 
contributing to the current reality of the legal system.11 There is often an element of aspiration 
in this invocation of the ‘is’ and ‘was’ in that particular traditions or current realities may be 
regarded as helping to achieve a better future, but this future orientation is less important than 
identifying traditions from the legal past that contribute to the present.  
The European constitutional system is different in this regard. Mancini suggested that the 
Treaties had a pro-integration ‘genetic code’ which encouraged, or possibly required, the Court 
to interpret EU law in a pro-integration manner.12 The preamble to the Treaty spoke of ‘[laying] 
the foundations of ever closer union’13 between the peoples of Europe. Thus, the idea that the 
bodies set up by the treaties were merely foundations of a project that would later be realised 
                                                           
9 See for example, Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 where Kennedy J for the majority based his decision to overturn 
laws criminalising gay sex on a claim that anti-sodomy statutes were ‘far from possessing ‘ancient roots’’ (p. 570) 
that ‘in our tradition the state is not omnipresent in the home’ (p. 563) and invoking ‘the laws and traditions of the 
past half-century’ (p. 571-2). In dissent Scalia J reiterated the Court’s repeated statement that rights ‘deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition’ were covered by the 14th Amendment’s protection of liberty (p. 593).  
10 e.g. Décision no 71-4 DC du 16 juillet 1971, Décision no 77-87 DC du 23 novembre 1977, ‘liberté d'enseignement 
et de conscience’, Décision no 99-414 DC du 8 juillet 1999, ‘loi d'orientation agricole’, Décision no 77-87 DC du 23 
novembre 1977, ‘liberté d'enseignement et de conscience’. 
11 See for example the statement of Lord Bingham in the House of Lords in A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (No.2) [2005] UKHL 71 that the Common Law had regarded ‘torture and its fruits’ with abhorrence for 
over 500 years and noting that this was a ‘deeply rooted tradition’. 
12 See F Mancini and D Keeling, 57 Modern Law Review (1994) 175 see also F. Mancini in Democracy and 
Constitutionalism in the European Union 44. 
13 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Preamble. 
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to a greater extent was in the Treaties from the very start and remains to this day (indeed its 
removal was one of the key goals of the British government due to their opposition to further 
integration).  
In this context, it is well-known that the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of the EU’s 
foundational constitutional documents has often enhanced the supranational elements of the 
EU but its approach to interpretation has also been noticeable for the fact that it is highly 
future-oriented. The Court’s teleological approach and commitment to ever closer union has 
meant that it has interpreted constitutional and legal texts with an eye to what the Union was 
intended or destined to become, not what it actually is. For example, even back in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the Court gave interpretations of the Treaty provisions relating to the 
European Parliament that were very protective of the EP’s powers. This view was underpinned 
by a vision of the Parliament as a provider of necessary democratic legitimacy to the law-
making process in Europe even before MEPs could really be seen as genuine holders of a 
democratic mandate to speak on behalf of European citizens.14 In other words, the Court 
protected the Parliament on the basis of the role that it will have to play in the future if a more 
integrated and powerful Union is to be legitimate.  
Similarly, as will be discussed in more detail below, the Court has interpreted EU citizenship not 
in the light of the rather meagre rights that attached to it at its birth15 but in the light of what it 
envisaged that it would become in the future. The central rhetorical plank of the Court’s 
approach to citizenship has been its assertion in the Grzelcyck16 case, which it has often 
repeated (including in Dano), that EU citizenship is ‘destined to become the fundamental 
status’ of EU citizens.17 Thus, the Court was interpreting the concept of citizenship, not on the 
basis of what it is, but what it will (or should) become. EU citizenship has been seen by the 
Court as something that will be subject to transformation by a process of ever closer integration 
that will transform it into the fundamental status of EU citizens. On this approach, citizenship’s 
                                                           
14 See for example Roquette Frères v Council 138/79 [1980] E.C.R. 3333 and Les Verts v Parliament 190/84 [1988] 
E.C.R. 1017. 
15 S. O’Leary The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship (Kluwer, 1996).  
16 Grzelcyck C-184/99 [2001] E.C.R. I-6193. 
17 Above at [31]. 
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current, more limited reality, would be interpreted in this light and would be therefore be 
expansively interpreted in order to be capable of fulfilling this larger future role. 
This orientation towards the future was perhaps inevitable given the commitment in the 
Treaties to ‘ever closer union’ which is an inherently future-oriented concept in that it refers to 
the future of the integration process. The fact that the Court has interpreted particular 
concepts not for what they are but for what they hope them to become, should not therefore 
surprise us. It should be noted that the treaties speak of ever closer between the ‘peoples’ of 
Europe. The use of the plural in this context, as well as the later inclusion of commitments to 
subsidiarity and to respecting the diversity of Member States show that the integration process 
was always intended to have limits and would never reach the point where Member States 
were entirely replaced by the Union. Nevertheless, the facts that the Treaties did not envisage 
the extinction or replacement of Member States and that the European Council was willing to 
acknowledge (in the pre-referendum deal offered to the UK)18 that all states were not 
committed to closer political union, do not mean that over the past five decades the ‘direction 
of travel’ of the integration process (i.e. ‘closer union’) has not been clear. Treaty changes since 
the 1990s did include principles such as subsidiarity which could be seen as favouring national 
rather than EU level action and allowed various member states (most notably the UK) to opt 
out of the integration of various policy areas, however this has not changed the fact that the 
clear overall trend has been to increase the supranational nature of the Union and to widen its 
competences.  
Despite periods of stagnation and occasions, such as the Luxembourg crisis of 1965, where the 
primacy of national interests and a desire to ensure that states could block actions perceived to 
threaten their interests have brought the integration process to a halt, the predominant trend 
in the European integration process has been towards more intensive integration. At least until 
the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, each treaty change had involved extension in the 
                                                           
18  European Council, Draft Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, 
concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union 4/16 2 February 2016. 
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competences of the Union and the expansion in the use of voting procedures, such as Qualified 
Majority Voting in the Council, that enhance the supranational nature of the EU. Unlike many 
federal states where there the boundaries of federal power are largely fixed in a grand bargain 
between the states and the centre the EU has seen near constant change in the boundaries of 
its competence with frequent competence-expanding treaty changes over the past 25 years. 
The degree to which the Union’s powers are intended to evolve was further underlined by the 
adoption of the ‘passarelle’ clause19 in the Lisbon Treaty which envisages changing power 
balances between the Union and Member States by unanimous agreement between Member 
States without the need for Treaty change. Increasing political resistance to integration has 
certainly had some effect. Treaty references to the diversity of Member States and 
commitments to substidiarity have been introduced and, as part of the failed bid to encourage 
the voters of the United Kingdom to remain in the Union, Member State governments offered a 
new, less integrationist interpretation of the term “ever closer union.”20 However, none of this 
changes the reality that the version of ever closer union seen in Treaty revisions has 
consistently been to expand the range of competences of the Union and to steadily 
enhancement of  over the past three decades, the powers and institutional structures of 
increase the supranational nature of EU decision making. Ever closer union in practice has 
                                                           
19 Treaty on European Union, Article 48, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012.  
20 References in the Treaties and their preambles to the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe are primarily intended to signal that the Union's aim is to promote trust and understanding 
among peoples living in open and democratic societies sharing a common heritage of universal values. They are 
not an equivalent to the objective of political integration.  
Therefore, the references to an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe do not offer a basis for extending 
the scope of any provision of the Treaties or of EU secondary legislation. They should not be used either to support 
an extensive interpretation of the competences of the Union or of the powers of its institutions as set out in the 
Treaties.  
European Council, Draft Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, 
concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union 4/16 2 February 2016 
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meant that the powers and institutional set up of the Union have not been regarded as 
definitive but rather as a temporary set ups on the road to the next phase of integration.21      
Ever Closer Union, Functional Integration and Integration through Law: Means to a More 
Integrated Future 
The constant evolution in EU competences and institutions is not surprising. The idea that EU 
structures were not intended to be permanent but rather provisional precursors to a more 
integrated future was deeply woven not just into the language of the Treaty but also the 
method of integration chosen by those who founded the EEC, that of functional integration. As 
Wallace notes, Jean Monnet was both a federalist and also committed to a strategy of ‘elite-led 
gradualism.’22 Under this strategy, integration of functional areas would bring benefits that 
would generate populate support for more integration or as Holland states: ‘[Monnet] saw the 
emergence of loyalties to Community institutions developing as a consequence of elite 
agreements for the functional organization of Europe.’23 
Although they were open about the fact that they were launching a politically ambitious project 
that was intended to develop over time, those who launched the project of European 
integration chose a process of integration that involved avoiding politically and symbolically 
charged areas such as defence and foreign policy whose integration had provoked major 
political resistance.24 They focused instead on integrating less controversial ‘functional’ areas. 
Their hope was that integration would then proceed by means of ‘spill-over’ i.e. that integration 
of one area would create the momentum for integration in another. Scholars such as Lindberg 
have long noted the nature of this functional integration to be somewhat self-sustaining. He 
defined ‘spill-over’ as ‘a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a 
                                                           
21 This may partly explain why the ECJ has so rarely played the role that constitutional courts often play in other 
multilevel polities: the role of policing the limits of federal authority. National constitutional courts usually 
interpret constitutions that establish fixed the boundaries of competence between the central government and 
the sub-national units. As the boundary between the Union’s competence and that of the Member States was, 
under the text of the Treaty, expected to continually shift in favour of the Union, it is not surprising that the ECJ 
has only rarely intervened to enforce boundaries on EU competence. 
22 H Wallace ‘European Governance in Turbulent Times’ 1993 31 JCMS 293. 
23 M Holland European Community Integration (Saint Martins Press 1993), 16 quoted in P Craig in P Craig and G. De 
Burca (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1999) 6. 
24 An attempt to found a European Political Community in the 1950s had been rejected by the French Parliament. 
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situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn 
create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth’25.  
It is notable that the choice made was of a mechanism that avoided integrating politically 
controversial or symbolically important areas. However, it was also recognised that such 
avoidance could not be permanent. The approach of the founders of the Union is reminiscent 
of Saint Augustine’s famous request “Lord make me chaste, but not yet”. They chose the 
mechanism of functional integration in the hope that it would be economically successful and 
would establish a degree of interdependence that would progressively make integration of such 
controversial areas necessary and more palatable to electorates over time. In other words, the 
positive impact of integration would bring about support for further integration. Thus, we see 
that, from the beginning, an approach was being sought that could compensate for the initial 
weakness of popular support for intensive integration (and possibly remedy it by provoking, as 
will be discussed below, the growth of European identity). Craig notes that this neo-
functionalist view was the dominant ideology of Community integration. It was, he argues 
‘intuitively attractive’ but also suffered from being ‘economically deterministic’. It failed to 
explain the actual course of integration which did not proceed in a smooth linear fashion. 
Rather than progressing smoothly, the integration process moved in fits and starts and 
experienced repeated episodes, such as the Luxembourg crisis of 1965 where assertions of 
national interest caused the process to stall. This led to qualification of neo-functionalist 
theories in later later explanations such as the intergovernmental approach of Moravscik.26 
Nevertheless, neo-functionalism was not discredited and has, in qualified form, retained 
significant force as an explanation of elements of the integration process. Craig notes that: 
‘The neofunctionalist account had dismissed the normative importance of democratic 
institutions, on the ground that the increased affluence rendered possible by technocracy 
                                                           
25 L N Lindbergh The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
1963) at p. 10 quoted in B Rosamond Theories of European Integration (Macmillan Press, Hampshire and London, 
2000) at p. 60. 
26 A Moravcsik Preferences and Power in the European Community: An Intergovernmentalist Approach’1993 
Journal of Common Market Studies 31 473. 
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would produce the consensus of apathy which undermined any active interest in or concern for 
the political process.’27 
However he concludes that, although it is always difficult to show causality in these matters ‘it 
is arguable that functional spill-over created and continues to create come impetus for further 
integration.’ 28  This view has much to recommend it. Although neo-functionalism had 
underestimated the influence of factors beyond the hoped for economic benefits of integration 
and although it had not predicted the stop and start nature of the progression of the 
integration process, it was central to the vision of founders such as Monnet and, 
notwithstanding various incidents of stagnation or stalling in the integration process, the 
overall trend of the integration has been for integration in one area to create a need for 
integration in another and a constant (though not smooth) movement in the direction of 
further integration.  
The fact that this consistent trend towards further integration continued was, to a significant 
degree, made possible by the role of law in the integration process. As neo-functional 
integration was not based on mass support it was vulnerable to eruptions of nationalist feeling 
or when integration touched on any controversial issues. The high degree of political consensus 
amongst member states in relation to social and economic policy in the post-war period 
reduced the risk that European integration would become a means by which highly 
controversial policy agendas were advanced. Such consensus has been declining since the 
1970s and has been badly fractured by the current economic crisis. Of course, this is not to say 
that the question of European integration was not, even in the early decades of the 
Community, the subject of vigorous political dispute or that voters and politicians were 
unaware in the early days of the Community that the integration process being launched was 
highly ambitious and likely, eventually, to touch on highly salient political matters. However, 
knowledge that, in the future a highly salient political issue such as national defence or 
budgetary policy may come under a future European polity produces very different political 
                                                           
27 P Craig in P Craig and G. De Burca (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 
1999) 7. 
28 Ibid. 5.  
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reactions from those produced by attempts to extend in the present, European competence to 
such matters. Thus, the possibility that the Euro may one day requires a common EU finance 
ministry is a lot less alarming to electorates and produces much less intense political backlash 
than a proposal to establish such a ministry today. The early days of the Community were not 
entirely politically harmonious and  vigorous political disputes on matters such as the Common 
Agricultural Policy,29 the role of national vetoes30 and the question of the financing of the 
Community.31 However, though these matters were hotly-contested at the time, they were of 
considerably less political (and electoral) salience than matters such as control of budget 
deficits and immigration policy which constitute the terrain on which disputes around the 
boundaries of EU competence are fought out today.  
Because disputes in relation to EU policies and powers did not relate to issues that were 
matters that were of the utmost salience to electorates and because Western Europe enjoyed 
relatively high levels of political consensus on socio-economic policy in the early decades of the 
integration process, there was significant scope for judicial institutions to play a role in 
unblocking political deadlock without provoking an uncontrollable political backlash. Provided 
that the relevant matters were not matters of life and death importance to electorates, the 
politically-insulated nature of the legal process could allow integration to be carried out in a 
context somewhat shielded from politics and potentially popular invocations of national 
interests. Indeed, given the counter-majoritarian tendencies of constitutional adjudication 
(particularly in the context of the EU treaties where a tiny minority (i.e. a single state) could 
block constitutional change), it is unsurprising that law, and constitutional jurisprudence, were 
key methods through which integration insulated from political controversy could be achieved. 
Scholars have long noted the key role played by law and by judicial interpretation in the process 
of European integration. Weiler, Ceppelletti and Seccombe noted centrality of law to the 
development of what was then the European Community in their seminal 1986 study of 
‘Integration through Law’ in which they stated ‘the law is both the object and the agent or 
                                                           
29 See the account of the Stresa Conference of 1964 in European Commission, The European Commission 1958-72: 
History and Memories, (European Commission, 2007). 
30 For example the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 1965-66. 
31 For example the debate around the ‘own resources question’ in 1970. 
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instrument of integration. While law is a product of the polity, the polity is also to some extent 
the creature of the law.’32  They were correct. European law, both in the form of the Treaty and 
secondary legislation adopted by European institutions, has been central to moving the 
integration project forward. This integration has often taken the form of EU legislation or ECJ 
decisions expanding the scope of EU rights but it has also taken other forms such as informal 
cooperation and coordination of policies, soft law instruments such as issuing “Guidelines” and, 
particularly since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, various forms of monitoring and reporting 
(discussed in more detail below). Despite the increasing importance of such integration 
mechanisms, integration by means of enacting legislation or by pro-integration interpretations 
of EU treaties and legislation by the Court of Justice have been significant drivers of the 
integration process. Although political debate remains resolutely national and the EU budget 
remains tiny compared to national budgets, the Union has passed a vast amount of legislation, 
even allowing it some scope to regulate, in some circumstances, big spending areas such as 
health, education and social welfare which remain national competences. In addition, EU law 
has come to be accepted as a part of national law enforced by national courts. The 
interpretative approach of the Court of Justice has been key to this process of integration 
through law.  
The Court’s interpretation of the Treaties as including the direct effect and primacy of European 
law had, as many have noted, a transformative effect on the integration process.33 Alter 
showed how, in the past, the Court has been particularly important in breaking political log-
jams and has pushed integration forward most intensely when political deadlock stalled the 
integration process. She also has shown how the ECJ has historically been a notably 
strategically-minded and political court in the sense that it has used its power to decide cases 
brought before it in a strategic way in order to promote the legal and political integration of the 
                                                           
32 As quoted in D Augenstein ‘Identifying the European Union: Legal Integration and the European Communities’ in 
D Augenstein (ed.) ‘Integration through Law’ Revisited: The Making of the European Polity (Ashgate, Farnham, UK, 
2012) 111. 
33 P Craig and G de Burca EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed.) (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New 
York, 2003) 182. 
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Union.34 For example, famous decisions such as that in Cassis de Dijon35 had an impact way 
beyond the specific issue of free movement of goods and the circumstances under which states 
should recognise each other’s regulatory decisions but were also about using EU law to push 
forward legal, and therefore political, integration between Member States. Indeed the ruling in 
Cassis de Dijon provides a good example of both integration through judicial interpretation and 
of the operation of the ‘spill-over’ mechanism. The ruling achieved, by means of creative 
judicial interpretation, a result that had been politically unattainable.36 In addition, the ruling 
promoted a spill-over process. The Court’s ruling that Treaty provisions in relation to free 
movement of goods included a principle of ‘mutual recognition’ placed a question mark over 
the status of large amounts of national regulations and thus changed the political incentives of 
Member States, making it easier to win their agreement to the enactment of European product 
standards. 
The central role of law in European integration has meant the juridification of public life has 
been particularly strong in the EU. Large areas of public policy such as competition law, became 
matters of legal rather than political contestation though as Veitch noted, this phenomenon is 
not restricted to the EU but has been a notable feature of the globalized economy in general.37 
In any event, it suffices to say that the law and its interpretation has been a key method 
through which ever closer union has been achieved to date without the necessity to achieve 
majority support amongst EU voters  
Limits of Integration through Law and Spill-Over: Political Salience 
Just as it was thought that functional integration would bring about popular support for further 
integration, the process of integration through law was not seen as the end of the integration 
process. Rather, as Augenstein notes, those who studied and described the phenomenon in the 
1980s were of the view that ‘law as an agent and object of integration triggers a gradual 
                                                           
34 K Alter Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of the International Rule of Law in Europe’ 
(Oxford University Press, 2001). K Alter The European Court’s Political Power (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
35 ReweZentral AG. (120/78) [1979] E.C.R. 649. 
36 Although the result of Cassis de Dijon had been unattainable politically, it was not politically salient in the way 
that budgetary policy or migration policy are today, thus making judicial action to obtain the result a feasible 
prospect. 
37 S Veitch ‘Juridification, Depoliticization and Integration’ in Augenstein (ed.) above n. 22 at 93.  
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process of convergence in the European States that lies at the heart of an emerging European 
identity’.38 In other words, the initial weakness of support for integrating politically or 
emotionally charged areas of policy could be overcome by the fact of integration of less 
charged policy areas. Integrating the law in areas would lead to ‘a mutually reinforcing process 
of co-evolution’ between law and society.’39 The overlap with neo-functional analysis is clear. 
On this view, as Rosamund put it (in relation to the hoped for economic benefits of integration 
of functional sectors), ‘politics would follow economics’ 40 and integration would trigger the 
sense of European identity necessary for integration of an intensity that was not initially 
feasible.  
This has not proved to be the case. Augenstein rightly notes that an emergence of ‘socially 
differentiated transnational communities’ has taken place. However, he suggests that this ‘casts 
doubt on the linkage of convergence with an emerging European identity as it ‘hardly compares 
to the more encompassing integration of national societies ‘through law’ that was envisaged by 
the Integration through Law school’.41 We are faced with a situation where the mechanisms of 
functional integration with spill-over and integration through law, which were intended to 
resolve the problem of insufficient initial public support for intensive integration, have not 
produced the sense of shared identity necessary to increase such support. Looking back, the 
assumption that an ‘encompassing integration of societies’ would take place seems naïve and 
deterministic, especially once the Union was expanded from 6 to 28 member states.  
Even assuming that the integration process did end up producing economic benefits all-round, 
it was never a safe bet to assume that politics and loyalty, in Rosamund’s words, ‘would follow 
economics’. As Raymond Aron observed ‘it is a denial of the experience of [the twentieth] 
century to suppose that men will sacrifice their passions for their interests’.42 Though Benedict 
Anderson was right that they are ‘imagined’, national identities are very real and remain the 
fundamental focus for the political loyalty of very many people in Europe. It was perhaps naïve 
                                                           
38 Above n 32. 
39 Bankovwski summarising Augenstein in ‘Law, Integration and Progress’ in Augenstein (ed.) above n 22 at 115. 
40 L N Lindbergh The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford University Press, 1963) at p. 10 
quoted in B Rosamond Theories of European Integration (Macmillan Press, 2000) at p. 60. 
41 n. 32 above at  111. 
42 Quoted at p. 114 of T Judt When the Facts Change (Vintage, 2015). 
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to assume that economic success could effect significant change in this area. Furthermore, as 
the experience of the misery of intra-European war faded from the memory of most Europeans, 
awareness of why post-war leaders saw the creation of pan-European institutions as so vital 
would also fade. Tony Judt wrote of the ‘paradox of the welfare state’ under which the success 
of European welfare states would, ‘over time, undermined their appeal’ as those who grew up 
under such states would not experience the wrenching poverty or insecurity that motivated 
those who established welfare systems. Accordingly, they would ‘forget why they had sought 
such security in the first place’.43 European integration suffers from an analogous problem. 
Those who grew up in an integrating Europe do not have experience of anything but peaceful 
relations between states and the ability to work and travel freely across the continent. They are 
therefore likely to take such benefits for granted in a way their grandparents would not. 
Amongst European elites, a degree of European identity did develop. The mass demonstrations 
against the British exit from the European Union seen in the summer of 2016 did show that, 
when facing loss of a European identity, many people discovered that it mattered to them 
rather more than they had realised. On the other hand, the result of the UK’s referendum 
equally showed that such identity is a minority phenomenon and ideas of national sovereignty 
remain powerfully attractive to many. 
Full consideration of the multitude of reasons that such a broader European identity did not 
grow to the degree as envisaged by the founders of process of European integration is beyond 
the scope of this article. It may well be that those who launched the integration project fell into 
what Mark Lilla, in another context, calls ‘fantasies of historical inevitability’44 and felt that as 
Bernard Williams said of those who believed in the the inevitability of progress that they were 
being ‘cheered on by the universe’.45 After all, in retrospect, there was no reason to think that 
European identity would inevitably grow as integration proceeded. It may therefore be that the 
failure of such identity to develop as foreseen is not surprising and that the limited success in 
creating European identity amongst particular groups was as much as, or more than, could have 
been expected.  
                                                           
43 Judt , n. 42 above at 324. 
44 M Lilla The Still-Born God (Verso, 2007) at 306. 
45 Quoted in Judt, n. 42 above at 331. 
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Either way, what is important for my purposes is that the development of European identity 
and political loyalty to European institutions has not developed to the degree necessary to 
support intensive further integration between EU member states. At the same time the logic of 
spill-over (the fact that integration can produce a need for further integration) and Mancini’s 
‘genetic code’ of the Treaties that pushes the EU judiciary to interpret them to favour ever 
closer union, both remain and both encourage a drift towards further integration.  
However, this does not mean that these pressures will mean that, notwithstanding a relative 
lack of support, a continual drift towards further integration will occur. There are reasons to 
think that the ability of the integration process to proceed with relatively limited public support 
is coming to an end. Lindberg noted as early as 1966 that integration could cause stress 
between states when it came to cover more politically salient issues and could thus deter 
further integration. 46 The end of the ‘permissive consensus’ under which public opinion did not 
significantly oppose transfer of power to European institutions came to an end with the conflict 
over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and has intensified in the decades since. In 
addition, as integration has deepened, it inevitably begins to touch on more salient issues. 
Functional integration and the spill-over it generated could never themselves have been used 
to integrate emotionally-charged or politically salient areas. Rather they were ways to build 
support for future moves to carry out integration in such areas. Thus, the functional integration 
and integration through law encourage and require further integration but in the absence of 
‘loyalty transference’ 47 they may be increasingly incapable of making such integration a reality. 
As noted above, although there were intense political disputes during the early decades of the 
Community, at the time, European institutions did not have significant power over the most 
salient political issues such as welfare policy or budgetary policy and issues over which it had 
some influence, such as migration, were not the political hot potatoes they are today. This is 
not the case today where the boundaries of the integration process now lie across the most 
salient and controversial areas of political life. Once integration efforts begin to affect more 
politically salient areas such as welfare policy or budgetary policy the political resistance to 
                                                           
46 Rosamond, n. 25 above at 64. 
47 Quoted in Rosamond above, n 25 at. 65-66. 
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integration becomes too intense for integration through adventurous judicial interpretation or 
‘elite led gradualism’ to be viable options. In addition, unhappy experience of integration be it 
at a micro level through an event such as the rapid arrival of large numbers of EU migrant 
workers in a particular town or at a macro level where the unhappy experience of the Euro, 
may cause increased resistance to future integration. The reality that popular opinion can 
prevent integration that the spill-over process actively requires can be seen most notably in 
Jean-Claude Juncker’s comment that the Member State governments knew exactly what they 
needed to do to resolve the Euro crisis but did not know how to get re-elected once they had 
done this.48  
Viability of Standing Still: Problem 1: Policy Incoherence 
If there is potentially insuperably strong resistance to further integration in some areas, might 
the solution be for Member States to maintain current levels of integration without moving 
further forward? As mentioned above, a key contention of this article is that a system designed 
for ever-closer union may struggle to function if integration in the sense of expanding the 
content of EU legal rights or empowering EU institutions and reducing the scope for member 
states to block the adoption of laws and policies, comes to a halt. Lindberg49 noted that an 
initial degree of integration to achieve a particular benefit could require further integration in 
order to fully achieve that benefit. Nonetheless, the potential downside of partial integration is 
not limited to incomplete achievement of a benefit. Partial integration can prove actively 
damaging and can upset previous compacts between several competing factors in socially and 
economically important matters. Partial integration can take two forms. The first involves the 
integrating one policy area (e.g. monetary policy) but leaving another policy area (e.g. fiscal 
policy) which needs to be closely coordinated with the integrated policy area, in national hands. 
The second form involves integrating an area of policy but to an insufficiently supranational 
degree thus denying Union institutions to power to adapt such policy as necessary by allowing 
Member States to prevent changes in policy with relative ease (by requiring unanimity or 
                                                           
48 See ‘Profile: EU’s Jean-Claude Juncker’ BBC News, 15 July 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
27679170 (last visited 19 February 2015). 
49 See above fn. 25. 
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supermajorities for new legislation). In both of these scenarios, the first steps in the integration 
process were taken on the assumption that they would be followed by further steps (either the 
expansion of EU competence to other areas or the relaxation of law and policy making rules). If 
those further steps are not taken, the act of initial integration may impose costs that would 
otherwise not have been incurred. The first form these costs can take is that of ‘policy  
incoherence’ where steps towards integration bring about a situation where the various EU 
rules or a combination of EU and national rules, operate at cross purposes, undermining the 
ability of each to achieve the goals intended or where the rules and structures brought about 
by the degree of integration achieved to date produce otherwise avoidable negative outcomes 
for the Union and its Member States (such as lower growth and higher unemployment). The 
second form that costs can take is that of policy rigidity, where once EU law is in place it cannot 
be adapted as circumstances require due to the large supermajority needed to pass amending 
legislation. The spill-over mechanism can therefore end up being a net negative by creating 
extra disruption and suffering that can only be solved by further (politically impossible) 
integration. 
The next section provides two examples of the first form of cost outlined above. It highlights 
two key features of the Union’s current dilemma. First, it shows that the fact that integration 
process is now touching on areas that are more politically salient than before (both due to their 
political and symbolic importance and because of divergence between Member States as to 
appropriate policy options to pursue) means that previously successful integration mechanisms 
cannot achieve integration as they could in the past in relation to less salient matters. Second it 
shows that in each case, the level of integration achieved to date is inherently unstable and can 
be actively damaging. The first example relates to recent cases on EU citizenship such as Dano50 
and Alimanovic51 where the Court of Justice, operating in the politically-charged area of welfare 
entitlements for EU citizens, felt unable to develop its caselaw on citizenship in the 
integrationist direction that characterised the rhetoric and substance of many of its previous 
decisions on EU citizenship. This has left the law in this area in a state that is apt to cause 
                                                           
50 See above fn. 4. 
51 See above fn. 5.  
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significant incoherence in policy. The difficulties in the partially-integrated law on citizenship 
and welfare rights is mirrored in the second example, the Eurozone where Member States are 
unable to muster the political will to fulfil the need for integration of fiscal policy that the 
creation of a single currency created and are left with an actively damaging partially-integrated 
status quo. 
EU Citizenship and Social Welfare: Partial Integration Producing Policy Incoherence 
In Dano the Court of Justice was faced with a case that touched on the rights of EU citizens to 
access welfare payments. EU citizenship has been an area where the Court’s jurisprudence has 
been characterised by a commitment to realisation of a more integrated future under which 
European political and civic identity increases in relative importance and distinctions between 
citizens of one’s own State and those of other Member States are reduced. Judgements in this 
area have born the mark of the ECJ’s unusual relationship to time. As noted above, the Court 
has repeatedly stated that Union citizenship was ‘destined to be the fundamental status’52 of 
nationals of Member States, thus focusing its interpretative approach not solely on the current 
reality of EU citizenship but also on the future role that such citizenship must be developed to 
play in a more integrated future.  
The Court has played a significant role in expanding the rights attached to EU citizenship, 
including welfare rights. However, previous rulings that expanded welfare rights of EU citizens 
affected relatively small numbers of people and did not generate much political backlash.53 
That is no longer the case, levels of movement of workers between EU states have risen sharply 
since 2004, welfare budgets are under pressure due to the ongoing economic crisis and ‘welfare 
tourism’ is a hot political topic most notably in the United Kingdom’s referendum on its 
continued membership of the EU. 
In these circumstances, Ms. Dano’s case, which involved a reference from a German court in 
which an economically inactive Romanian national, resident in Germany, challenged a refusal to 
                                                           
52 Grzelcyck, Case C-184/99 [2001] E.C.R. I-6193. 
53 S. O’Leary 27 Yearbook of European Law [2009] ‘Developing an Ever-Closer Union between the Peoples of 
Europe’ 167 at 174-77, cited by D. Thym ‘When Union Citizens Turn into Illegal Immigrants: The Dano Case’ (2015) 
40 European Law Review  249-262 at  260. 
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grant her social welfare benefits, was particularly politically salient. Ms. Dano had argued that 
she had a right of residence in Germany as an EU citizen and that Directive 2004/38 (‘the 
Directive’) gave her the right to equal treatment with German nationals in relation to social 
welfare payments.  
The Court ruled that as Ms. Dano was economically inactive, she had no right of residence 
under the Directive (the EU treaties also confer a right of residence but the Court assumed the 
Directive had correctly codified the rights of citizenship conferred by the Treaty). Previous 
judgments had identified the objective of the Directive as the facilitation of free movement 
rights and had seen any measure that limited such a right as an exception to the objective of 
the legislation that should be interpreted narrowly. However, in Dano the Court characterised 
preventing ‘economically inactive EU citizens from using the host Member State’s welfare 
system’ as a key objective of the legislation rather than as an exception to those objectives.54 As 
Ms. Dano was not economically self-sufficient and had little chance of finding work, the Court 
concluded she did not have a right of residence in Germany under EU law and was not covered 
by EU law rights to equal treatment with German citizens in relation to social welfare 
payments. This more restrictive approach was confirmed by the Court in Alimanovic55 where 
the Grand Chamber, citing its decision in Dano, held that there was no right to equal treatment 
with Member State nationals in respect of social assistance payments for EU citizens whose 
right to remain in a Member State arose solely from their seeking of employment. 
This along with the ruling in García-Nieto56 which followed the central holding in Dano and 
Alimanovic, tends to confirm Thym’s suggestion that the decision in Dano represents are 
particularly significant turn away from the Court’s attempts to drive forward the development 
of a more meaningful concept of EU citizenship.57 The ultimate objective of this drive was seen 
most notably in the Courts repeated statements in decisions since Grzelcyck that Union 
citizenship was ‘destined to be the fundamental status’58 of nationals of Member States. Thym 
                                                           
54 Above, n. 4, at [69]. 
55 Alimanovic (C-67/14) ECLI:EU:C:2015:597 
56 García-Nieto (C-299/14)  ECLI:EU:C:2016:114would 
57 N. 53 above. 
58 Grzelcyck, Case C-184/99 [2001] E.C.R. I-6193. 
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rightly notes that the approach of the ECJ in this case can be seen as a decisive turn away from 
broader visions of European citizenship that are aspirational and which transcend ‘the rationale 
of market integration’. The judges of the Court, he suggests, have ‘abandoned attempts to 
participate in the legal construction of ‘real’ citizenship.’ The case, he concludes, is a ‘powerful 
reminder of the limits of transformative integration through law’. 59  
It is no coincidence that the reminder of these limitations came in the context of a politically-
charged case. The gleeful reaction of some national governments (most notably the Germany 
and the UK who receive high numbers of EU workers)60 shows the degree to which a win for 
Ms. Dano would have been extremely controversial. Peers wryly noted that the decision 
showed that European judges ‘read the newspapers’.61  Integration through law and functional 
integration were both designed to keep the integration process clear of politically-charged 
matters until a sufficient sense of European identity and the integration-created need for 
further integration made integration of sensitive areas possible. However, as Augenstein 
noted,62 that sense of identity has not developed as expected. Consequently, when faced with a 
highly-charged question such as welfare rights, the Court felt unable to adhere to its 
programmatic and ambitious visions of EU citizenship as it had done in other less controversial 
cases. 
The decisions in Dano and Alimanovic could be seen as a case of disintegration rather than 
standing still. Peers saw Dano as involving ‘a clear rejection, as compared to the prior case-law, 
of access to benefits by those who have never worked and who are not looking for work’63 
However, the caselaw on access to welfare benefits has always been rather unclear.64 In 
                                                           
59 Thym, above n 53 at 260-261. 
60  See ‘Court lets EU Nations Curb Immigrant Welfare’ The New York Times, 12 November 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/europe/european-union-welfare-benefits-to-immigrants.html (last 
visited 18 February 2015). 
61 See S. Peers ‘Benefit Tourism by EU Citizens: the CJEU Just Says No’ EU Law Analysis, 11 November 2014, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2014/11/benefit-tourism-by-eu-citizens-cjeu.html (last visited 18 February 2015).  
62 Above n. 32. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See for instance the tension between Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, where the Court ruled a student 
could rely on Articles 18 and 21 TFEU to get access to a maintenance grant and Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I 
8507, where the imposition of long integration periods for access to such grants was upheld. Even when the Court 
has upheld the right of equal access to benefits that seek to facilitate access to employment, it has been clear that 
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addition, as Peers himself also notes,65 the key change in these cases is the increased deference 
on the part of the Court to the conditions on rights to residence and equal treatment in relation 
to security established by the Union’s legislature in the Citizenship Directive. Thus, what the 
Court did was to grant less weight than before to Treaty-based programmatic notions of EU 
citizenship (such as the idea of the destiny of such citizenship seen in Grzelcyck) in its 
interpretation of the law relating to citizenship rights. The greatest change was not to what it 
has done in relation to the development of citizenship rights in the past but in the Court’s 
perception of how those rights could be developed in the future; it was scaling back its 
programme to develop EU citizenship into the fundamental status of nationals of Member 
States. As will be discussed below, the Court did not wipe out the many existing citizenship 
rights that have previously been developed by the Court. Thus, the most significant change was 
not to the past of EU citizenship but to its future. By failing to question on Treaty grounds the 
limitations established by the legislature to citizenship rights in this area the Court has moved 
to a position where it regards such limitations no longer merely as temporary restrictions to be 
progressively removed as EU citizenship moves towards fulfilling its destiny to become the 
fundamental status of EU citizens.   
The problem with this approach to EU citizenship is that it produces the kind of incoherence 
mentioned above where one set of EU norms operates at cross purposes from other EU or 
national norms. If such incoherence were a passing teething problem of EU citizenship that 
would be one thing, but if it is permanent, the costs will be much higher and will have 
significant consequences for the workability of EU citizenship and its interaction with other 
legal rules. For example, because the judgment did not reverse existing EU law rights to enter, 
move and re-enter states, it will be very difficult to actually expel ‘illegal migrants’ such as Ms. 
Dano. The Court has found that Ms. Dano has no right to residence under EU law and therefore 
no right to social assistance. The German authorities may therefore move to expel here. 
However, she retains under Directive 2004/38, a right to return to Germany at any stage and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
this reasoning did not apply to ‘social assistance’ benefits access to which is limited by Article 24(2) of Directive 
2004/38 (see Cases C-22 and 23/08 Vatsouris [2009] ECR I-4585. 
65 N. 61 above. 
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cannot be refused entry on economic grounds.66 She and the German authorities are faced with 
a potential scenario of a never-ending round of expulsions and returns. The right to move freely 
and enter the territory of a Member State means that Ms. Dano cannot be stopped at the 
border and prevented from re-entering Germany. Procedural guarantees provided to EU 
citizens means that each expulsion is likely to be cumbersome, costly and time-consuming for 
the German authorities67 and if Ms. Dano gets to remain legally for 5 years at any stage she will 
then be able to enjoy full access to the welfare system.68 This is an inherently unstable situation 
that calls out for greater coherence. 
Thus, we can see that in this case the spill-over mechanism can be a net negative by creating 
policy incoherence that can only be solved by further (possibly politically impossible) 
integration. The initial degree of integration provided by free movement and rights of residence 
creates (as the spill-over mechanism intends) the need for further integration. When this 
proves unattainable, incoherence results. Having developed a concept of citizenship in the light 
of a prediction in relation to the course of integration (i.e. that EU citizenship would become 
the fundamental status of member state nationals) the Court is left with a ‘half-built house’ 
when that prediction did not come true. 
Of course, poorly-coordinated laws and policies are a phenomenon that occurs from time to 
time in all polities. The difference is that in the EU it is extremely difficult to take steps to 
ameliorate this situation. In theory, providing such coherence and re-establishing a more stable 
situation could potentially occur by granting greater access for EU citizens to national welfare 
systems. In the past the ECJ may have gambled that, as in the case free movement of goods, an 
adventurous, pro-integration interpretation of EU citizenship as including significant access to 
welfare rights would not generate an unmanageable level of backlash. However, welfare policy 
is now well outside the ‘zone of indifference’ within which Schmitter noted integration is 
                                                           
66 Directive 2004/38 gives a right to EU citizens to admission to Member States who can produce a national ID card 
of a Member State and prevents refusal of entry on economic grounds (Articles 5 and 15, Directive (EC) 2004/38 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 OJ L158. 
67 For confirmation that safeguards in relation to expulsion apply to EU citizens found not to have a right of 
residence under the Directive see Case C-50/06 Commission v Netherlands. [2007] E.C.R. I-4383.  
68 Directive 2004/38, Article 16(1) (n 49 above). 
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easiest.69 The other integrationist option would be for such integration to occur via EU 
legislation. However, just as there is little public support for establishing the kind of pan-
European treasury and fiscal policy that could help resolve the Eurozone crisis, there is similarly 
low support for creating EU level welfare rights or an EU welfare system.70 In any event, the 
Court has now twice confirmed the holding in Dano, indicating that it does not feel capable of 
developing citizenship rights in this direction. 
The alternative solution would be to restrict free movement rights to make it easier to prevent 
re-entry by those who have been expelled on the basis of a failure to fulfil the self-sufficiency 
condition set down by the directive. It is possible that the Dano decision could herald the 
beginning of a movement that brings about more radical restriction of EU citizenship rights but 
this would be very difficult to achieve under current EU structures. Restrictions beyond those 
accepted by the Court in Dano would require Treaty change which would be politically very 
difficult to achieve. In addition, Member States are rightly reluctant to unpick painfully worked 
out compromises as evidenced by the repeated statements on the part of the 27 states 
remaining in the EU that no deal could be reached with the UK following the Brexit referendum 
that permitted access to the Single Market without acceptance of free movement rights.71 
Every state has aspects of free movement or other legal principles with which it is unhappy so 
attempts to roll back free movement rights would risk a wider unravelling of the EU project. As 
the United Kingdom is discovering following its referendum, curtailing EU law rights is 
extremely difficult as so many economic and social arrangements have been made on the basis 
of such rights. Similarly, for remaining EU members, substantial restriction of free movement 
rights would be economically and socially disruptive given that millions of Europeans, from 
German retirees to Polish plumbers have moved to live and work in other EU states or have set 
up other arrangements in reliance on existing free movement rights. Of course, the 
                                                           
69 Discussed in Rosamond (n 25 above) at 64. 
70 A notable proposition in this regard was that of Schmitter who argued for a ‘Euro Stipendium’, summarised by 
Van Middelaar ‘a monthly allowance for all citizens of the Union whose income is less than a third of the average’ 
L. Van Middelaar The Passage to Europe (translated by L Waters) (Yale University Press, 2013) at 262.  
71 See, for example ‘EU “Crystal Clear” that Single Market Access Means Accepting Freedom of Movement’ The 
Daily Mail, 30 June 2016 (www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/pa/article-3665103/Cameron-Makes-exit-EU-talks-
Brexit.html). 
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unpredictable nature of politics means nothing can be ruled out. Political pressure may be such 
that Member States decide to bear the cost of the disruption caused by scaling back citizenship 
rights drastically. The point of this article is not that such an eventuality would never occur but 
rather to point out that ‘standing still’ (neither regressing nor progressing) is not a viable 
option. In any event, the difficulty of securing even legislative change in this area is shown by 
the fact that even when the Court of Justice has rendered decisions such as that in Metock72 
which expanded free movement rights in ways opposed by a clear majority of Member States, 
legislative reversal of the judgment has not been possible.  
The Eurozone: Partial Integration Producing Destructive Policy Outcomes 
The dangers to the policy coherence that results when political salience serves to prevent the 
integration process continuing as the spill-over process requires are not restricted to the 
specific legal issues raised in Dano. They are representative of the broader challenges facing the 
Union both in relation to the Eurozone and to the Union’s political system more generally. 
There can be little doubt that the future of the Eurozone is a highly-salient issue or that this 
salience is a major impediment to the realisation of the further integration that most observers 
and most Member State governments believe is necessary to resolve the crisis. As already 
noted, Jean-Claude Juncker famously said, Member State governments know exactly what they 
needed to do to resolve the Euro crisis but do not know how to get re-elected once they had 
done this.73  
The travails of the Eurozone are also a clear indicator of the fact that the potential downside of 
partial integration is not limited to incomplete achievement of a benefit. They are, in fact the 
perfect demonstration of how partial integration can cause policy incoherence and can prove 
actively damaging as well as upsetting previous compacts between several competing factors in 
socially and economically important matters. In depth economic analysis is beyond the scope of 
                                                           
72 See for example the failure to reverse the ruling in Metock (Case C-127/08. [2008] E.C.R.I-6241) although a large 
number of Member States opposed this ruling. 
73 See ‘Profile: EU’s Jean-Claude Juncker’ BBC News, 15 July 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
27679170 (last visited 19 February 2015). 
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this article and the competence of the author,74 but one does not need to be a professional 
economist to understand and recognise that unifying monetary policy in the Eurozone deprives 
Member States of the ability to tailor monetary policy to the specific needs of their national 
economy and has accordingly upset the balance between monetary and fiscal policy in national 
economic policy making. It has meant that, because states could not use monetary policy to 
regain lost competitiveness they have had to rely on painful internal devaluation at the cost of 
enormous suffering.  
Furthermore, given the economic divergence between Eurozone states, some states will 
inevitably be stuck with an interest rate that is too high for them but too low for some of their 
partners. As Gerner-Beuerle et al. point out, ‘in federal systems, fiscal policies play an 
important role in facilitating the adjustment of the different regions to asymmetric shocks’.75 In 
the United States, for example, taxing and spending by the federal government helps to 
compensate for economic divergence between states. A booming state will pay more in tax 
some of which will be transferred in the form of welfare payments to a state that is in economic 
difficulties. This helps to compensate for the rigidity caused by the setting of a single monetary 
policy. 76 This does not occur in the EU as the integration achieved so far has been partial, 
covering monetary policy only.  
The establishment of the single currency therefore created, in classic spill-over fashion, the 
need for further integration of other areas such as fiscal policy. This kind of integration could 
have been facilitated in a number of ways. A sense of European level political identity and 
loyalty could have grown that built support for transfer of powers over fiscal policy to EU level. 
Alternatively, electorates, while still lacking strong European identities, may have been 
sufficiently unconcerned by the issue of fiscal competence to have adopted a permissive 
approach to measures transferring such competences to the Union. Neither of these scenarios 
                                                           
74 See, for example, P. De Grauwe Economics of Monetary Union (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 
9th ed. 2012). 
75 C. Gerner-Beuerle, E. Küçük and E. Schuster, ‘Law Meets Economics in the German Federal Constitutional Court: 
Outright Monetary Transactions on Trial’ German Law Journal 15 (2): 281–320. 
 
76 See R. McCrea ‘The EU Should Put its Money Where its Mouth Is: the Need for Fiscal Competence at EU Level’ 
The Irish Times, 13 January 2004 which argued that the Euro was unsustainable without integrated fiscal policy. 
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applied. The sense of European identity has not developed to the extent that voters in creditor 
countries are willing to contemplate a transfer union where EU fiscal competence forms the 
basis for transfer payments from states with economic growth to those in recession. In 
addition, the issue of transfer of fiscal competence to the EU has proved to be highly salient in 
political terms, indeed, the unhappy experience of the Euro has hardened opposition to further 
economic integration (notwithstanding that such integration may be a partial solution to the 
problems caused by the Euro).  
Furthermore, in contrast to the relative consensus on socio-economic policy that applied 
between Member States in the early decades of the integration process, there is a high degree 
of divergence between current Member States both in terms of economic development and in 
terms of perceptions of the correct social and economic policies to pursue (the view of the ideal 
solution to the crisis in Athens and Paris is very different from the view in Berlin and Helsinki). 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that voters have proved highly resistant to moves to 
transfer fiscal competence to the Union, there is no agreement either on whether to transfer 
such powers or on what policy goals to pursue with such powers should they be transferred. 
Intergovernmental Co-Operation: A Feasible Third Way? 
It would be unfair to describe the Eurozone states as having entirely stood still in the face of the 
crisis. Faced with pressure from the spill-over process to integrate further to mitigate the 
economic problems caused by the design of the Euro and with political pressure against moves 
to confer fiscal or other economic competences on the EU, Member States have been forced to 
come up with forms of integration that depart from approaches that involved conferral of 
substantial power on EU institutions. 
The period since 2008 has seen significant efforts to develop intergovernmental structures to 
help the Eurozone to cope with the crisis without conferring significant additional competence 
on EU institutions. Faced with Eurozone states in severe financial difficulty and Treaty 
prohibitions on the provision of loans or bail-outs by the ECB77  the Member States established 
                                                           
77 Articles 123 and 125 TFEU. 
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intergovernmental bodies such as the European Financial Stability Facility78 and later the the 
European Stability Mechanism.79 These bodies were intended to provide loans to Member 
States in financial difficulty. The degree to which established EU structures were unable to cope 
with the challenge is underlined by the fact that such bodies were established on the basis of 
intergovernmental agreements between Member States outside of the framework of the EU 
law. 
Integration in the area of economic policy has focused on strengthening procedures involving 
surveillance and coordination of the economic policies of Member States with relatively few 
substantive powers being conferred on EU institutions. The ‘European Semester’ provides a 
mechanism for coordination of Member State economic and budgetary policies. The European 
Council establishes guidelines for national policies against which national plans and policies are 
judged. While it is true that the European Commission may issue ‘Country-Specific 
Recommendations’ on a range of economic policies these recommendations are discussed and 
approved by the ECOFIN Council of EU finance ministers.80 The Union has also established what 
has become known as the ‘Six Pack’. This is a set of six changes to the Pact for Stability and 
Growth covering state fiscal policies and what are called ‘macro-economic imbalances’.81 
Though mainly intergovernmental, these measures do have some teeth. Under these 
procedures Member States at risk of ‘macro-economic imbalances’ are identified and are given 
recommendations by the European Council on the basis of proposals by the Commission. 
Financial sanctions for non-compliance can be imposed on Member States that fail to make the 
necessary adjustments to their economic policies. Eurozone states have also adopted a ‘Fiscal 
Compact’ which requires national parliaments to avoid government deficits of over 0.5% of 
GDP.82 This agreement also envisages possible financial sanctions for non-compliance. 
                                                           
78 See: Brussels, Council of the European Union, 10 May 2010, 9596/10 (Presse 108). 
79 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (2012). 
80 See ‘The European Semester’ The European Commission, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/the_european_semester/index_en.htm (accessed 
20 July 2016). 
81 See the Sixpack (package of 5 regulations and one directive) OJ L 306, 23 November 2011. 
82 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (2012). 
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These measures are notable for the predominance of intergovernmental action. The EFSF and 
ESM were set up by intergovernmental treaty. Surveillance powers have been increased, 
sometimes with penalties for non-compliance, but the key decisions as to what aims are to be 
selected and what punishments are to be issued are made by the Member States. The 
European Parliament has no significant role and the European Commission is largely reduced to 
carrying out the instructions of the Member States with little power to take binding decisions 
independently. 
Some Recourse to Familiar Methods 
Of course, the picture is rather complicated and some of the steps taken do have recognisable 
traces of forms of integration that achieved success in the past. The Member States have 
agreed to confer greater powers of supervision of the banking system on the ECB (though 
tellingly, they have as yet been unable to agree upon a full banking union that would include a 
common deposit insurance fund or single resolution mechanism for cases when banks fail).  
Similarly, just as the Court of Justice rescued the EEC from ‘euro sclerosis’ in the 1970s through 
its audacious interpretation of the Treaty articles on free movement, the Court has played a key 
role in the Eurozone crisis. Most notably, it has adopted a lenient approach to policing the limits 
of the powers of the European Central Bank. Despite the fact that the ECB is prohibited from 
offering ‘overdraft facilities’ to Member State governments under the Treaty, in 2012 the Bank 
adopted the ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ policy83 under which it undertook to buy 
unlimited quantities of government bonds in order to ensure that the Bank’s decisions on 
interest rates were properly transmitted to financial markets (subject to compliance by 
Member State governments with the conditions imposed by any ESM or IMF backed 
programmes (such as the ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ agreed with Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal as part of their post-crash bail outs). Adopting the widest possible view of the powers 
of the ECB, the Court of Justice held that this programme fell within the boundaries of 
                                                           
83 ‘Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions’ European Central Bank Press Release, 6 September 2012. 
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monetary policy, did not violate the ban on deficit financing and was accordingly not ultra 
vires.84  
Similarly, in the Pringle case in relation to the establishment of the ESM, the Court of Justice 
rejected a challenge alleging that the ESM amounted to interference with the EU’s exclusive 
competence in relation to monetary policy and undermined the no bail-out, no loan 
requirements of Articles 123 and 125 TFEU.  
The travails of the Eurozone are a powerful indicator of the degree to which, integration in one 
area can produce the need for integration in other areas as well as the problems that arise 
when the political salience of the area in question prevents such further integration from taking 
place. The economic and social difficulties caused by the ‘half-built house’ of the Eurozone 
mean that standing still and maintaining a single currency without any integration of fiscal 
policy is not an option. The intensity of opposition to transferring fiscal competence to EU 
institutions means that such integration as has taken place has been notably governmental. The 
Court of Justice has assisted by providing generous interpretations of the scope of the powers 
of the ECB. However it would be politically impossible for the Court to use its judicial powers to 
break the political deadlock and advance fiscal integration in the same revolutionary way it did 
in relation to free movement rights in Cassis de Dijon in the 1970s. 
A Feasible Solution? 
There must be significant doubt as to whether the forms of intergovernmental cooperation 
provide a sustainable basis for the Eurozone or successfully address the negative outcomes in 
terms of lack of coordination between fiscal and monetary policies that the creation of the 
Eurozone has brought about. The intergovernmental measures taken have certainly introduced 
greater supervision and control of national fiscal and economic policies but they fall well short 
of the kind of fiscal transfer union needed to allow the Eurozone to operate in the same way as 
successful monetary unions such as the USA where fiscal transfers from the centre help to even 
out the economic cycle within a monetary union where the interest rate may be too low for 
booming regions and too high for those in recession. Indeed, it seems that those kind of 
                                                           
84 Gauweiler (C-67/14) ECLI:EU:C:2015:400 
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measures have been renounced even as goals by EU institutions and Eurozone states. Although 
the scale of changes necessary to make the Eurozone work has not changed in the past few 
years, there has been a notable shrinkage during that period in what leading pro-integration 
figures believe is even worth aiming to achieve. In 2012 the ‘Four Presidents’ Report’85 was 
issued by the presidents of the European Council, European Commission, the ECB and the 
Eurogroup (the group of finance ministers of Eurozone states).  The report argued for ‘genuine 
economic and monetary union’ including a ‘banking union, significant integration of budgetary 
policies including a possible additional budgetary capacity at Eurozone level and a common 
debt instrument (a limited form of Eurobond called Eurobills), and a strengthening of 
democratic legitimation and accountability –potentially brining about at least a degree of 
political union.’86 Yet, as Begg notes, ‘only the banking union dimension made much progress’ 
and even in that area Member States have shied away from measures such as a single 
resolution fund and common deposit insurance mechanisms which might involve significant 
transfers from one state to another.’87  
There is no reason to think that such measures had become less necessary in the ensuing three 
years yet when the Five Presidents (the original four having been joined by the President of the 
European Parliament) released a further report88 in 2015 the reduction in the ambition of the 
measures proposed was striking. As Begg noted ‘the more contentious components have been 
dropped or toned-down in scope. There is no longer any mention of new fiscal capacities nor of 
debt mutualisation. Instead there is a more vague call to create a ‘fiscal stabilisation function’, 
the details of which will be worked out by an expert group to be set up in due course. Principles 
for fiscal stabilisation include avoiding a system that will result in permanent cross-border 
                                                           
85 Council of the European Union, ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ 5 December 2012. 
86 See I Begg ‘What does the Five Presidents’ Report Mean for the Future of the Euro?’EUROPP Blog  
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/06/23/what-does-the-five-presidents-report-mean-for-the-future-of-the-
euro/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Europp+%28EUROPP+-
+European+Politics+and+Policy+at+LSE%29 (accessed 19 July 2016). 
87 Ibid. 
88 European Commission ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ 22 June 2015 available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf (accessed 19 July 2016). 
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transfers – plainly intended to allay the concerns of the creditor countries – as well as ensuring 
compliance with fiscal rules.’89  
The extent of political resistance to further economic integration is therefore such that the 
Presidents have ceased even to aim for measures which, three years previously they thought 
were vital to the survival of the Euro. Therefore, while not quite standing still, the Union has 
been unable to move forward to the degree necessary to safeguard the Euro or eliminate the 
costs that an imbalanced monetary union is imposing on Member States. The Union is 
therefore stuck between the powerful need to integrate fiscal policy to enable to Eurozone 
economy to function properly and the equally powerful political resistance to the integratiave 
measures needed to carry this out. 
The extensive intergovernmental cooperation achieved is testament to the political 
determination of the Member States to save the Euro. The audacious actions of the ECB upheld 
by equally audacious interpretations on the part of the Court of Justice speak to a similar 
determination on the part of EU institutions. While a combination of Member State political will 
and EU institutional audaciousness has succeeded, for the time being, in staving off the 
existential threat to the Euro, these measures have primarily aimed and functioned so as to 
preserve the existence of the single currency. They have not been the harbingers of a new 
phase of integration that harnesses the spill-over effect to allow for further integration. They 
can be seen more as measures that aim to ‘stand still’ and preserve monetary union rather than 
as evidence of successful operation of the spill-over mechanism. None of the measures comes 
anywhere close to ‘spilling over’ into the establishment a fiscal union. There has been no 
expansion of the EU budget to allow it to fund counter-cyclical measures in depressed areas, no 
establishment of an EU finance ministry and no mutualisation of debts. All measures to date 
have aimed at maintaining the already-integrated nature of monetary policy (by saving the 
single currency) rather than allowing integrated monetary policy to spill over into integrated 
fiscal policy. If political opposition amongst Member State electorates were not a factor or if 
political identification with Europe had grown more than it has, perhaps integrated monetary 
                                                           
89 See Begg above n. 86. 
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policy would have, with a few inevitable bumps in the process, spilled over into integrated fiscal 
policy but this has not happened. Electorates are sufficiently opposed and sufficiently 
motivated in their opposition to ensure that such spill over is politically impossible. We remain 
stuck with what De Grauwe has characterised as ‘incomplete monetary union’ with 
mechanisms that are, in his view, too small to provide an effective means of preventing the 
development of crises of confidence in Member States and are not adequate to allow the Union 
to respond to economic shocks. 90  
Therefore, in relation to the Eurozone, the spill-over mechanism has created the need for a 
form of integration that is impossible to achieve politically. The failure to achieve that 
integration results in highly destructive policy incoherence with unduly long recessions and high 
unemployment in some regions and a general climate of recrimination and resentment. As in 
the case of free movement rights, moving forward or backwards would be extremely difficult. 
There is no political appetite for either of the measures necessary to resolve the incoherence. 
Very few wish to cause the huge disruption or to incur the vast costs that dissolving the 
currency union would involve. Neither will voters countenance the degree of fiscal union 
necessary to make the Euro workable. The solution cannot come from the integrative 
mechanisms previously relied upon. The permissive consensus is over. Electorates are highly 
engaged in their opposition to fiscal integration, the number of Member States is much higher 
than in the 1970s and 1908s and there is no consensus as to what economic policy should be 
even if the EU did manage to gain some authority over it. The Eurozone is as Tim Parkes [EU 
says, half way across a stream ‘unable to complete the transition it has set itself, rather than 
fording the stream it is sinking in the mud’.91 Remaning mid-stream, as he rightly notes, is not a 
solution. 
Partial Integration and Legislative Rigidity  
If, as I argued, the Eurozone’s problems show that the spill-over mechanism, aided by creative 
judicial interpretations can no longer deliver integration when the areas to be integrated 
become strongly salient politically in the Member States, we are dependent on the political 
                                                           
90 N. 74 above at 17 and 124. 
91 T Parks ‘’Why the EU Had it Coming’ The New York Times, 10 July 2016. 
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system of the Union to use its powers to deliver solutions to the policy incoherence brought 
about by partial integration. Yet, as I have already noted above that in relation citizenship and 
welfare rights, there is little prospect that any measure capable of resolving the incoherence 
highlighted by the Dano decision is unlikely to gain the support needed to make it through the 
legislative system of the Union. Put simply, the Union’s law making structures are not 
sufficiently flexible to allow EU law to be adapted as necessary. Scharpf has written of the ‘joint 
decision trap’ noting that where decisions require a large majority or unanimity ‘the default 
provision will always be the status quo’92 even when this is not anyone’s desired outcome. This 
is a scenario that is particularly likely to arise in the EU. 
The Union’s legislative system is one that can be said to be ‘partially integrated’ even in relation 
to areas where it enjoys full competence. In many multilevel polities the central government 
has full authority to legislate over the areas ceded by the sub-units to common control.93 This is 
not the case in the EU where the rules for enacting or amending legislation provide significant 
scope for Member States to prevent changes to laws. Many key areas of policy remain subject 
to unanimity and the institutions established to deal with the Eurozone crisis all require 
supermajorities for significant decisions. Any treaty change to bring about more fundamental 
change to alleviate the Eurozone crisis will require unanimous agreement of Member States. 
Much has been written about the negative effect of political gridlock in the United States.94 The 
American legislative system has such a proliferation of veto players that amending laws is 
exceedingly difficult and it is therefore hard for law to be adapted as society’s knowledge and 
needs change. The EU legislative system is even more rigid. European law now covers important 
areas such as employment law, elements of environmental policy and budgetary matters all of 
which interact with changing social and economic realities. However, it will be extraordinarily 
difficult to change these laws even if they are revealed to be damaging to the economic or 
                                                           
92 Discussed in Rosamond, note 25 above, at 61. 
93 In US, even the rule requiring 60 votes to close debate on a proposal in the Senate is actually a rule of procedure 
of the Senate itself rather than a constraint on the ability of the federal government to legislate by simple majority 
over areas it controls. 
94 See for example D. W. Brady, Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Jimmy Carter to George W Bush (2nd 
ed.) (Westview Press, 2006) which argues that gridlock is built into the American legislative and policy-making 
system. 
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social interests of the Union or most Member States. Indeed, in many areas, such as free 
movement, change can come only if all Member States support it. What prospect would 
legislative reforms have in the United States have if any changes to areas such as employment 
law or environmental standards had to be approved by the Governors of all 50 states? Given 
the rise of populist parties in many Member States, the prospect of a single state paralysing 
decision-making cannot be discounted. 
 
It must be acknowledged that, although Treaty change remains subject to unanimity, in relation 
to legislation passed under the Treaties, there has been a steady erosion of national vetoes. The 
use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) has been expanded to cover a wider range of areas with 
each revision of the Treaties. The significance of this should not be minimised. The willingness 
of Member States and their peoples to be bound by the decisions of other states with which 
they may disagree is remarkable. Impressive though this may be, it does not mean that the EU 
political system is capable of dealing with the challenges posed by partial integration of 
politically salient areas.  
Even where a matter is covered by QMV, there is often reluctance in the Council of Ministers to 
depart with the culture of consensus that has built up over decades and to pass legislation that 
some Member States strongly disagree with. Even if this is overcome and the Council seeks to 
adopt legislation by QMV, the majority needed is very high (55% of the states representing 65% 
of the population of the Union). This is the kind of level of support more akin to the kind of 
supermajorities needed to amend constitutions in many states.95 Indeed, Tridimas notes how 
the difficulties of securing support in the legislative system has made the Union rather 
dependent on the innovative approach to interpretation of the ECJ. He argues that political 
deadlock between Member States has often led to the production of ‘fudged’ or unclear 
legislative texts, encouraging (and perhaps depending on the Court, to resolve this lack of 
clarity through adventurous interpretations.96 The weakness of the EU’s political institutions 
                                                           
95 This is a key difference from the German system where state governments in the Bundesrat do have the ability 
to block some actions of the federal government but where a majority rather than a super-majority is needed to 
put a measure through the upper house. 
96 T. Tridimas ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’ 21 European Law Review  199 [1996] at 205. 
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and their need to grant Member States wide scope to block legislative measures has meant that 
historically, the EU’s law-changing abilities were like the senses of a blind person whose hearing 
developed extra capabilities in order to compensate for the lack of vision. The European 
judiciary, like the blind person’s hearing, has, taken on a role in the development of the law 
that was beyond that normally given to courts. However, the enhanced hearing ability of a blind 
person does not fully compensate for the lack of vision and similarly, adventurous 
interpretation by the Courts is not an adequate substitute for a functioning, flexible political 
system. The introduction of QMV gave the EU political institutions more ‘sight’ than before but 
still much less than the political institutions of a normal polity. If the Court is no longer willing to 
play the large (and democratically problematic) role in law-making and promoting further 
integration that it has historically played, the EU maybe left relying on political institutions that 
are still institutionally incapable of bearing this burden.97 
 
The EU’s political system must operate by supermajority. Unlike a national parliament whose 
electorate is bound by a dense national identity that allows a national government to take a 
decision that may enrich one region and impoverish another without the latter region 
questioning its authority. Because of the failure of a strong European identity to emerge, the 
different regions of the EU remain the primary focus of political loyalty. Accordingly, EU political 
institutions do not have the authority to create winners and losers in the way a national 
government can. Its system must therefore give scope to Member States to block measures 
which they feel harm their key interests thus, the EU’s political system requires super-
majorities for many key decisions. As it operates by supermajority (and often unanimity) this 
system requires an extraordinary degree of political consensus as to the type of policies that 
ought to be pursued. As noted above, the level of political agreement on economic matters that 
existed in early the early decades of the integration process no longer applies. Indeed, the 
recent rise of populist parties who challenge the centrist Christian and Social Democratic 
                                                           
97 Here a parallel can be drawn to the economic governance of the Eurozone where the absence of adequate fiscal 
powers at EU level has meant monetary policy has been required to take on a disproportionately large role in 
dealing with the crisis. 
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parties that have long dominated politics in most EU states shows that the degree of political 
consensus is falling not rising.  
 
Therefore, it is not merely the substantive law of the Union that requires further integration to 
function adequately. The EU’s law-making system itself needs to be significantly more 
supranational than it currently is if the Union is to prove viable and effective as policymaker in 
the long term. No legal system can hope to react effectively to changing economic 
circumstances if all of its law is entrenched in a manner similar to constitutional entrenchment 
at national level making and is therefore extremely difficult to amend. As noted above, Burke’s 
observation ‘A State without the means of some change is without the means of its 
conservation’98  may well apply to the EU. Member States do not trust each other sufficiently 
and European citizens are too attached to their nation states to empower European institutions 
with the necessary legislative rules that would allow EU law to be easily amended. Easy 
amendment would make it too easy to expand EU powers or for a majority in EU institutions to 
pass laws inimical to the interests of particular states. National parliaments which benefit (in 
most Member States) from strong national loyalties, have the authority to take decisions that 
benefit one region and disfavour another. EU institutions’ voting rules reflect the fact that they 
simply do not have the kind of cultural or political authority to pass or amend laws in ways that 
make winners of some states and losers of others without losing the allegiance of the latter. On 
the other hand, in the long term, we cannot have a system where vast areas of law, much of 
which deals with changing and dynamic areas such as employment law, are effectively 
unamendable. Current law-making structures are workable only as transitional institutions 
which pave the way for a more integrated Union where the national vetoes (and even the super 
majorities that apply to QMV) that make the current system so rigid, are much less common 
and it is far from clear that such a set-up is an attainable prospect. 
 
Conclusion  
                                                           
98 E Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (Oxford World Classics, 1993) (L G Mitchell ed.). 
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Functional integration, the spill-over process and integration through law have helped EU to 
achieve a very impressive degree of European integration. However, they have also themselves 
produced the need for further integration that may be politically impossible. As the examples of 
citizenship rights, the Eurozone and the Union’s law making structures show, this unmet need 
may prove very damaging. The EU now finds itself in something of a catch 22 situation. The 
electorate in most Member States want neither disintegration nor significantly intensified 
integration but standing still and maintaining current levels of integration is causing 
incoherence in policy and is actively destructive in some areas.  
 
Although it has been criticised,99 the idea that that European integration is like a bicycle (that it 
has to be moving forward or it will fall over) appears to be partly correct. I do not mean correct 
in the sense in which it was used by some of its proponents such as Jacques Delors, as a 
justification for further integration but rather in that it described the potentially destructive 
consequences of partial integration. ‘Ever closer union’ was not just a phrase, as Mancini 
suggested, it is deep in the DNA of the EU and may be an existential condition for the 
effectiveness and viability of the Union and its. The methods of integration chosen by those 
who founded the EEC mean that it is very difficult to call a halt to the integration process but 
the drop in political support for further integration raises acute dilemmas for the Union by 
creating demand for just such a stop. 
The use of functional integration and integration through law represented ways to get around 
the fact that integration of politically-salient and emotionally charged areas had insufficient 
public support. In conjunction with the integrative role played by the law (especially the Court 
of Justice) a large degree of integration was achieved. However, this could only be a temporary 
expedient. Spill-over and ever closer union meant that at some stage the integration process 
would begin to touch on highly salient areas. The sustainability of the integration process at this 
stage was always going to depend on ‘loyalty transference’ i.e. the emergence of the degree of 
European identity and public support for integration that was initially lacking. Whether or not 
one favours taking further steps in the integration process, one cannot get away from the 
                                                           
99 See for example, T. Garton-Ash ‘Europe’s Endangered Liberal Order’ Foreign Affairs (1998) Vol. 72 51-65, 62.  
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reality that many of the steps now completed were made in the assumption that they would be 
followed by additional steps. 
 
The collapse of the permissive consensus and progressively more difficult ratification of each 
successive treaty have shown that this support has not developed. Furthermore, though 
integration was a success in many areas, in some key areas, such as the Euro, the unhappy 
experience of integration on the part of many Member States has actively undermined support 
for further integrative steps. There is low support for a break-up of the Union but there is 
equally low support for significantly intensified integration. One possible response is to muddle 
through with various incremental measures that increase integration slowly and thus avoid 
political backlash. It is not clear that this is feasible long-term solution. As political salience of 
integrated areas has increased so has political and legal resistance to creeping integration. The 
2011 EU Act in the UK required a referendum for any new transfer of power to the Union, no 
matter how slight100 and the aim of the British government to remove the commitment to ever 
closer union from the treaties has relatively high public support in many Member States101 
Indeed, neither the guarantees of the EU Act nor the recognition by other Member States that 
the UK was not committed to ever closer union was sufficient to avoid a majority vote to leave 
the Union in the UK’s 2016 referendum. These issues are not restricted to problematic Member 
States such as the UK which was never fully on board with the political integration element of 
European integration. On the legal front, the German Constitutional Court has been 
consistently warning that the Union is reaching the outer limits of the incremental integration 
which it can tolerate.102  While it is true that, particularly in relation to the Eurozone, Member 
States have been experimenting with more inter-governmental forms of integration. However, 
the degree of integration achieved by these methods is insufficient to remedy the policy 
problems being caused by the Eurozone’s design. In addition, intergovernmental structures are 
even more prone to paralysis than the already, highly rigid law-making structures that 
                                                           
100 European Union Act c 12, 2011, section 4.  
101 See R. Ruparel ‘Appeal of Ending Ever Closer Union Stretches Well Beyond the UK’ Open Europe, 13 August 2015 
http://openeurope.org.uk/blog/appeal-of-ending-ever-closer-union-stretches-well-beyond-the-uk/ (last visited 25 
September 2015). 
102 See 2 BvE/08, Judgment of 30 June 2009. 
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characterise the European Union so provide no solution to problem of the EU’s rigidity and 
inability to effect change. 
 
If further integration is impossible to achieve then reversing the integration process is another 
option. It is one that would be enormously costly and involve abandonment of the idea of ever-
closer union that, as the unusual relationship of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence to times 
shows, has been at the core of the integration project to date. Were it to occur it would 
represent confirmation of the central thesis of this article, namely that standing still is not a 
viable option and either further integration or disintegration is required. 
 
Functional integration and integration through law were means by which it was hoped to create 
facts on the ground that would eventually encourage. As Hoffmann pointed out as far back as 
1966,103 there was a fundamental decision to be taken as to whether the aim of European 
integration was creation of a further super-state or to go beyond the state as a paradigm for 
government. The hope was, that decision on this and on the fuller integration of key areas 
could be put off until the day when integration itself had convinced the peoples of Europe that 
intensive integration was what they desired. It seems increasingly likely that that day will never 
come.  
Writing in 1958 at the height of the brutal conflict over Algerian independence, the French 
philosopher Raymond Aron pointed out that, as Tony Judt ably summarised, ‘France lacked 
both the will and the means either to impose French rule on the Arabs or to give the Arabs an 
equal place in France. If the French stayed the situation would only deteriorate and they would 
inevitably leave at some later date –but under worse conditions and with a more embittered 
legacy […] However impossible the choice appeared, it was nonetheless very simple. France 
must go’.  
The core of Aron’s warning was that sometimes we face stark dilemmas that can only be 
resolved by decisive choices. The unsustainable nature of the status quo of 1958 Algeria and 
                                                           
103 S. Hoffmann ‘Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe’ Daedalus 
Vol. 95(3) Summer 1966, p. 157. 
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the fruitlessness of the French pursuit of an option less radical than recognising Algerian 
independence, may hold lessons for today’s EU leaders. There are circumstances when 
maintaining the status quo is unsustainable and when decisive actions are the only feasible 
option. While it was clear in 1958 that France lacked the will to take any of the decisive steps 
needed to maintain its rule in Algeria, it is not entirely clear that EU Member States lack the will 
to move the integration process forward to the degree necessary to make EU law-making 
sufficiently flexible and to resolve the negative outcomes and policy incoherence being caused 
by partial integration in areas such as the Eurozone and EU citizenship. Eurozone states have 
taken significant steps to coordinate economic policies and to establish bodies that can provide 
emergency loans to states in difficulty. However, these steps fall some way short of the kind of 
decisive measures needed to cure the Eurozone’s ills. In addition, there appears to be little or 
no appetite for fundamental the reconsideration of EU voting rules needed to make the EU a 
sufficiently flexible policymaker. Member States seem determined to stick with a version of the 
status quo, taking piecemeal measures that do not satisfactorily address the fundamental 
issues facing them. Aron’s insight was to see that for France, there was no way to avoid a 
decisive choice and that playing for time may only increase the cost of the inevitable difficult 
choice to be made. The EU’s status quo is not sustainable. Attempting to live in denial of that 
fact will only make the inevitably hard choices to be made more costly. 
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